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Afterthoughts on Critiques to 
The Philosophy of Curiosity
ILHAN INAN
Department of Philosophy, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey
In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on 
my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Cu-
riosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, 
Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and 
Aran Arslan.
Keywords: Philosophy of curiosity, ignorance, curiosity, knowledge, 
reference.
At the time when I published my book, The Philosophy of Curiosity, 
there were only a handful of journal articles and book chapters within 
the philosophy literature on curiosity.1 Most of the questions that I ad-
dressed and discussed in that book—let alone the answers I proposed—
were ones that were hitherto not even raised by any philosopher in the 
long history of our discipline of more than two millennia. It is a joy to 
see that in the past four years there has been a rise in interest in at 
least some of these issues. The extant and scarce literature back then 
dealt with two questions; one concerning what curiosity is, and the oth-
er on whether it is valuable. No doubt these are the two most interest-
ing and perhaps also the most central philosophical questions that may 
be raised on curiosity. There was however no discussion, for instance, 
on the question of whether for a being to become curious it is a precon-
dition for them to have the ability to construct a mental representation 
of something unknown. This issue immediately brings forth various 
other related questions. Is being curious and intentional mental state? 
Does mental representation of the unknown always have conceptual 
content? Can beings who do not possess a language be curious? The list 
goes on and on. Once you start pondering upon these questions, you 
fi nd yourself in a rich area of research at the crossroads of philosophy of 
1 For the philosophical literature on curiosity prior to 2012 see the Introduction 
to Inan (2012).
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language, philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, value theory, and 
even philosophical logic. The articles in this issue raise and discuss 
some of these important issues; some are favorable to my theory of cu-
riosity providing valuable extensions of my views, and others are more 
critical, raising several fundamental objections; yet all of them I have 
read with joy. Nenad Miščević does a wonderful job in arguing that cu-
riosity is “the foundational epistemic virtue”, a view I somewhat mere-
ly presupposed in my work, but did not have the resources to argue for. 
Both Mirela Fuš, and Danilo Šuster address an interesting topic that 
I had little to say about in my book, namely meta-curiosity, that is cu-
riosity regarding one’s own mental states such as beliefs, or even one’s 
own curiosity. With her strong practical and theoretical background in 
the Philosophy for Children movement, Irem Günhan Altıparmak dem-
onstrates why curiosity ought to be a central notion in this discipline, 
by—to my delight—utilizing some of my ideas. Aran Arslan takes up 
a rather technical problem concerning whether there are some special 
epistemic contexts in which the distinction between ostensible and in-
ostensible reference—on which my theory of curiosity is built—has any 
semantic signifi cance. On the more critical side Mirela Fuš and espe-
cially Erhan Demircioğlu propose certain considerations that question 
my view that not all instances of curiosity have propositional content. 
Safi ye Yiğit convincingly argues against my position that when one 
has merely inostensible propositional knowledge there must be at least 
one inostensible term in the sentence that expresses that proposition. 
Perhaps the most pressing objection comes from Danilo Šuster who 
takes up certain cases of curiosity which appear to be problematic for 
my central thesis that curiosity as a mental state always involves the 
representation of an unknown entity through an inostensible concept.
Reply to Demircioğlu
By appealing to the distinction between objectual and propositional cu-
riosity I have argued that there are also two corresponding forms of 
ignorance. In his lucid paper Demircioğlu objects: 
…the problem is that whatever reason Inan brings forth for doubting “the 
propositional-bias” in the case of curiosity…could have been easily formulat-
ed, with relevant terminological changes being made, as reason for doubting 
that bias in the case of ignorance, and this shows that the argument from 
curiosity for the distinction between objectual and propositional ignorance 
is unnecessarily circuitous: assuming that the argument from curiosity es-
tablishes the conclusion that there is a distinction between objectual and 
propositional ignorance, that conclusion could also have been established 
without going through the roundabout way appealing to the distinction be-
tween objectual and propositional curiosity. (Demircioğlu 2016: 307)
Granted that an argument for the distinction between objectual and 
propositional ignorance can be given without mentioning curiosity at 
all. Demircioğlu’s objection is that bringing curiosity into the picture 
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does not add any further support for this conclusion. I think it does. 
That is because curiosity is typically expressed by the posing of a ques-
tion, and it is clear that that there is a genuine distinction between a 
wh-question and a whether-question. That a wh-question can never be 
answered by a simple “yes or “no” is suffi cient to show that what is be-
ing asked is not whether a certain proposition is true or false, which is 
what makes the curiosity expressed by such a question objectual. Given 
that typically curiosity arises out of ignorance, we should then conclude 
that in such cases the ignorance in question is also objectual. So an 
argument from curiosity to show that not every instance of ignorance 
is propositional, I believe, adds support to this conclusion. Let me also 
note that there is also a personal reason why I think this way; it was 
through philosophizing on curiosity that I came to realize the signifi -
cance of the distinction between objectual and propositional ignorance.
I have argued that there are two forms of propositional curiosity 
corresponding to the two forms of propositional ignorance, fact-igno-
rance and truth-ignorance. In reply Demircioğlu says:
Inan’s “fact-ignorance” is best understood as “failure to know the object that 
is a constituent of the fact that makes a proposition true” and as such it falls 
within the rubric of Inan’s objectual ignorance. So, the only form of propo-
sitional ignorance that we are left with is what Inan calls truth-ignorance. 
(Demircioğlu 2016: 309)
This appears to be (partly) a terminological issue. What I call “propo-
sitional ignorance” (corresponding to propositional curiosity) is one 
whose content is a proposition. When one does not know whether a 
proposition is true or false, the content of one’s ignorance is a proposi-
tion. Demircioğlu agrees. When one knows that a proposition in true, 
but is ignorant of the fact that makes it true, the content of one’s igno-
rance is still a proposition. In both cases the proposition in question is 
inostensible for the agent. In the former case, it is inostensible because 
the agent does not know whether it is true or false (and therefore does 
not know its referent), and in the latter case it is still inostensible given 
that the agent does not know the fact to which it refers (though he or 
she knows that it refers to a fact). That a term may be inostensible in 
these two different ways is easier to see when we consider defi nite de-
scriptions. The description “the closest planet to Earth on which there 
is intelligent life” is inostensible (most likely for all us) given that we do 
not know whether it has a referent, but the description “the cause of di-
nosaur’s becoming extinct” is also insotensible for anyone who does not 
know what it refers to even if they know that it must have a referent 
(given that they know that dinosaurs existed in the past, but no longer 
do so, and that it has a cause). Something similar takes place when we 
consider full sentences; one may be ignorant as to whether a sentence 
refers to a fact (when one does not know whether it expresses a truth 
or falsity), or one may know that the sentence does refer to a fact (when 
one knows that it expresses a truth) but is ignorant of the fact to which 
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it refers. (This is based on a theory of truth and falsity that I am cur-
rently working on in a new book project: a sentence is true just in case 
it refers, and is false just in case it fails to refer.) I agree that that fact-
ignorance may be taken as a special instance of objectual ignorance, 
but still we should not forget that it has propositional content. One 
reason why I wish to make the distinction this way is because one may 
have objectual ignorance of a fact even if the content of their ignorance 
is not propositional. This would be the case for instance if someone 
were to say “hey, did you hear what happened yesterday” and I have no 
idea to what fact she is talking about. In these cases reference to a fact 
is enabled by a defi nite description rather than a full sentence (i.e. “the 
fact my friend is talking about”), and therefore is not propositional.
The most pressing objection that Demircioğlu puts forth has to do 
with the distinction between objectual and propositional ignorance:
Let us call the thesis that for every case of objectual ignorance, there is 
a case of propositional ignorance with which it can be identifi ed proposi-
tionalism about ignorance (shortly, PI) … Inan is right that the fact that 
eliminating propositional ignorance eliminates objectual ignorance does not 
imply that objectual ignorance is the same as propositional ignorance. How-
ever, the question that calls for an answer is what it is that explains that 
fact: why does eliminating propositional ignorance eliminate objectual igno-
rance? The question receives a straightforward answer if PI is true. Inan’s 
account, on the other hand, owes us an answer. (Demircioğlu 2016: 311)
I agree that propositional knowledge can eliminate one’s ignorance 
even if the content of one’s ignorance is not propositional (though in 
most cases such knowledge has to be ostensible). My emphasis here is 
on the content of ignorance though, or to be more precise, the content of 
awareness of ignorance. It seems wrong to claim that when you are ig-
norant where your keys are, and your keys are in fact in the bathroom, 
then the content of your ignorance can be captured by the proposition 
that your keys are in the bathroom. After all this may not even have 
occurred to you. If not, then what you were aware of was not your igno-
rance that your keys were in the bathroom. If what Demircioğlu calls 
propositionalism about ignorance were to be correct, it would follow 
that being aware of your ignorance where your keys are, would be the 
same thing as being aware of your ignorance that they are in the bath-
room (assuming that it is true). This simply cannot be correct. When 
you are curious about where something is, (or who someone is, or why 
something happened etc.) and you have no hypothesis about the correct 
answer, then you cannot express your curiosity as a whether-question, 
and consequently you cannot express your ignorance in terms of a prop-
osition whose truth value you seek. Indeed, once you come to know that 
your keys are in the bathroom your ignorance as to where your keys 
are will be eliminated, and your curiosity will be sated. This in no way 
shows that you were curious about whether your keys were in the bath-
room. If it never occurred to you that your keys were in the bathroom, 
not even as an unlikely hypothesis, then you were simply not curious 
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about whether the keys were there. Of course you were ignorant that 
your keys were in the bathroom, but you had no awareness of this. It 
simply follows then that the ignorance of which you are aware that led 
you to be curious where your keys are, was not your ignorance concern-
ing the proposition that the keys are in the bathroom. To repeat, the 
fact that objectual ignorance can be eliminated by the acquisition of 
propositional knowledge does not show that objectual ignorance is also 
propositional. Demircioğlu seems to agree with this, but he thinks that 
I owe an explanation. My explanation is that when you have objectual 
curiosity there is a corresponding inostensible term, and one way of 
converting that term into an ostensible one is to acquire propositional 
knowledge. When you fi nd your keys in the bathroom, two things hap-
pen simultaneously; one is that by observing the whereabouts of your 
keys you convert your inostensible term “the location of my keys” into 
an ostensible one, and the other is that you gain propositional knowl-
edge of the fact that the keys are in the bathroom. It would not be cor-
rect to claim that propositional knowledge always has this affect.
Reply to Fuš
Mirela Fuš, in her interesting paper, argues that objectual curiosity 
has propositional content, which I strictly wish to deny. She claims 
that when Holmes is curious about who murdered Smith, he believes 
that someone murdered Smith, which of course has propositional con-
tent. For some reason she thinks that this belief statement is a “trans-
lation” of the original statement that attributes curiosity to Holmes. I 
cannot think of any sense of “translation” that would make her claim 
true. Curiosity-attribution is one thing, belief-attribution is another. It 
may be said that when Holmes is curious about who murdered Smith, 
he presupposes that someone is the murderer. But that expresses what 
he presupposes, it defi nitely does not express what he is curious about. 
In fact, by presupposing that someone murdered Smith, Holmes may 
be curious about things other than who the murderer is. For instance, 
if Holmes is curious about where the murderer is, he again may pre-
suppose that someone is the murderer. Furthermore, it is not clear to 
me that in order to be curious about who the murderer is, Holmes must 
believe that someone is the murderer. If the evidence Holmes gathers 
at the scene does not rule out the possibility that Smith was assaulted, 
or perhaps committed suicide, and if Holmes thinks that the evidence 
slightly favors the murder scenario, but not strong enough for him to 
come to believe that Smith was in fact murdered, then he may merely 
presuppose this without believing it. (For a more detailed discussion of 
this see Inan (2012), Chapter 11-Presuppositions of Curiosity.)
There is an interesting footnote in which Fuš mentions an objection 
due to Timothy Williamson:
Timothy Williamson (in personal discussions) pointed out that what is go-
ing completely astray with Inan’s strategy is that he is focusing all the time 
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on belief when the curiosity has to do with knowledge. For example, Wil-
liamson strongly disagrees with the above claim that “Curiosity can only 
take place when we come to realize the fallibility of our beliefs” (Inan 2014: 
145). He believes that somebody who has no awareness of their own fallibil-
ity can also be curious, let’s say, about what is inside of the box. For if you 
don’t know what is inside the box, you can still have a desire to know what 
is inside the box. This is for Williamson a result of his commitment that 
curiosity acquires a desire to acquire knowledge. However, for the sake of 
argument, I will proceed with Inan’s notion about one’s realization of one’s 
fallibility. (Fuš 2016: 317)
This appears to be based on a misunderstanding of my claim “Cu-
riosity can only take place when we come to realize the fallibility of 
our beliefs” (Inan 2014: 145). Perhaps I should have been a bit more 
careful in making this statement in the way that I did. I did not mean 
to suggest that for every instance of curiosity the subject has a belief, 
which he or she realizes to be fallible. First of all, I made this state-
ment within a context in which I was discussing propositional curi-
osity, and not objectual curiosity. Coming to realize the fallibility of 
our beliefs is a precondition only for propositional curiosity. Secondly 
note that the statement contains the notion of belief in the plural and 
not in the singular. That is because it expresses a general precondi-
tion for propositional curiosity. It can be paraphrased as: only those 
beings who have the capacity to refl ect on the fallibility of their beliefs 
can enjoy propositional curiosity. Otherwise it would be wrong to claim 
that in order for one to be curious about whether such-and-such is the 
case, one must come to realize that their belief that such-and-such is 
the case is fallible. That is because the curious subject may simply not 
hold such a belief. In order to be curious about whether there is life on 
other planets, you need not believe that there is life on other planets, 
in which case “coming to realize the fallibility of your belief” would not 
be applicable. In fact, as I have argued in the same paper, one may 
believe that such-and-such is not the case, and still be curious about 
whether such-and-such is the case. Despite the fact that Williamson’s 
objection is based on a misreading of what I said, I was nonetheless 
pleased about it, because it adds support to my contention that not 
every instance of curiosity is propositional. The example cited by Fuš, 
that is being curious about what is in the box, is an instance of objec-
tual curiosity. I am in full agreement with Williamson that this not 
need involve an awareness of the fallibility of any particular belief the 
subject has. This appears to show that Williamson agrees with me that 
not all curiosity is propositional.
In her paper Fuš brings up another very interesting issue, which 
unfortunately I never got a chance to deal with, at least not in print. 
This has to do with what may be called meta-curiosity, that is curi-
osity whose object is one’s own mental state. I take it that what Fuš 
calls “horizontal versus vertical dynamics” addresses this issue. This 
involves curiosity about one’s own beliefs, desires, knowledge, etc. and 
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even one’s own curiosity. If one does not have privileged access to one’s 
own mental states, in the sense that one’s beliefs about their own men-
tal states may at times be fallible, then it should be the case that one 
may enjoy curiosity with regard to one’s own mental states. This is 
indeed a very interesting issue and I am grateful to Fuš for bringing it 
up. Questions such as “what do I feel now?”, “do I love her?”, “do I sin-
cerely believe that this year will be better than the last?”, or even “am I 
really curious about whether there is liquid water on Mars?”, in certain 
contexts, may perhaps legitimately express one’s curiosity. There is ob-
viously a lot more to be said about this.
Reply to Šuster
Now another form of meta-curiosity is one that is about, not an object, 
but a concept. Danilo Šuster addresses this issue in his engaging paper 
and discusses it in length. In fact, Šuster is not convinced that such 
instances of meta-curiosity can be handled by my theory of inostensible 
conceptualization. He appears to be inclined to think that there may be 
other cases of curiosity as well which do not fi t this model. Before we 
get to these other cases fi rst let us look at what Šuster has to say on 
meta-curiosity.
Can we also be curious about something we are at the time unable to con-
ceptualize, to describe with an inostensible term? According to Inan (2012: 
65), “if we cannot express our curiosity by a defi nite description, then we 
really have not expressed a precise question that captures our curiosity.” 
This sounds plausible—the inability to conceptualize one’s inquiries is often 
a sign of confusion and one’s search in the dark. But not always. We are 
able to ascend to higher levels and ask meaningful questions about curiosity 
itself. We can be curious about the very conditions for the cognitive contact 
with reality: What representations to use? How to conceptualize a certain 
problem? What defi nite descriptions to use? Why should these questions not 
be allowed as the proper focus of curiosity? (Šuster 2016: 333)
To substantiate his point Šuster provides us with a nice example:
Let me illustrate some of these points with the help of a science fi ction nov-
el, His Master’s Voice (HMV), by Stanislaw Lem (published in 1968, English 
translation 1984). Its main topic, I would say, is scientifi c curiosity—scien-
tists are trying to decode, translate and understand what seems to be a mes-
sage from extraterrestials (specifi cally, a beam of neutrinos with regulari-
ties from the Canis Minor constellation) … Two years of intensive curiosity 
were mostly spent on formulating the proper questions for inquiry—how 
to conceptualize the strange phenomenon, what kind of inostensible terms 
to use. The initial question, I suppose, was just—what is this? And then 
the focus shifted to the hypothesis that the observed regularities consti-
tute a message. This was just a provisional, hypothetical conceptualization, 
typical, I would say, for certain foundational scientifi c investigations. Inan 
might say that the main question of curiosity was: “What is the meaning 
of the signal?” with “the meaning of the signal” as the inostensible term, 
standing for … what, exactly? Meanings make for very strange objects, even 
more so than facts (just consider the eternal search for “the meaning of 
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life”). In the scenario by Lem, this question comes very close to the ques-
tion of meta-curiosity: “How to represent the strange phenomenon?” (Šuster 
2016: 334)
Such cases of curiosity cannot be subsumed under an inostensible con-
cept according to Šuster:
Object level curiosity about X is based on our ability to conceptualize X, to 
introduce inostensible terms (“the X?”) and look for their referents. Meta-
curiosity is curiosity about these very representations: how to conceptualize 
the problem? What descriptions to use? What inostensible terms to intro-
duce? Again, one could always introduce inostensible terms, such as “the 
conceptualization of this problem.” Here, also, the inostensible reference 
seems to be just a different name for the problem. True, meta-curiosity is 
on the brink of confusion, but this is sometimes just a different name for a 
philosophical puzzlement. (Šuster 2016: 339)
First let me note that, under my theory, though meta-curiosity is a spe-
cial case that involves certain forms of higher-order conceptualization, 
even instances of ordinary fi rst-order curiosity that can be expressed 
in language also typically involve meta-cognition. When Holmes is cu-
rious about who murdered Smith, we assume that he is aware of his 
ignorance of what the referent of the term “Smith’s murderer” is. The 
content of the description is what I take to be a singular concept. Hol-
mes is then aware of his ignorance of the referent of this concept which 
requires him to attribute a property to it, which I take to be the proper-
ty of being inostensible. Curiosity that involves awareness of ignorance 
of the referent of a concept always requires one to attribute a property 
to that concept, namely the property of its being inostensible. In that 
sense curiosity expressed by a simple who-question does involve second-
order predication. Nonetheless it is not an instance of meta-curiosity 
given that its object is a person and not a concept. Curiosity expressed 
by a whether-question on the other hand is more abstract, in the sense 
that its object is not an object, but a property. Being curious whether 
there is life on other planets requires one to refl ect on this thought and 
to become aware of their ignorance about whether it corresponds to 
reality. In simple terms what they seek is whether it has the property 
of being true. If we take meta-curiosity to be the kind of curiosity which 
is directed toward not an object but a concept, we should conclude that 
curiosity expressed by a simple whether-question is also an instance 
of meta-curiosity. It is highly important to come to realize that beings 
that do not have the capacity for such forms of meta-cognition cannot 
enjoy curiosity as such. Now coming to the sort of meta-curiosity that 
Šuster mentions. When we experience a phenomenon which we cannot 
even recognize to be falling under any familiar sortal-concept we may 
become curious about how to represent the phenomenon in question. If 
we were to detect a signal that appears to be coming from outer space, 
we may be totally in the dark as to what it “means”. Granted that a 
description such as “the meaning of the signal”, in such a case, appears 
to be too vague or indeterminate to serve as a useful inostensible term. 
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If we cannot specify any kind of entity as possibly being the referent of 
such a term, then it is not clear what we are curious about. Now if this 
is indeed a case in which there is curiosity, but there is no proper inos-
tensible term that represents the object of curiosity as Šuster claims, 
then it should follow that the question “what are we curious about?” 
should have no defi nite answer. If so, then it seems to me that the men-
tal state of the subject who raises the question cannot properly be said 
to be one of curiosity. It may be mere perplexity, or perhaps some may 
wish to call it “proto-curiosity”. A more primitive version of such a case 
could take place when an animal, or even a human in the early stages 
of evolution, comes across something unusual and unexpected and can-
not make any sense of it. One may get a feeling of wonder in such a 
situation, in the sense of being astonished or perplexed, but this does 
not amount to curiosity. Now putting aside Lem’s novel, it seems to me 
that when the experts at NASA receive some unusual signal as such, 
they are not merely perplexed or astonished, but in fact curious. Given 
their linguistic skills, and their capacity for meta-cognition, they would 
be in a position to represent the unknown by an inostensible term that 
is a lot less vague and indeterminate than a phrase such as “the mean-
ing of the signal”. They could be curious about what its cause is, or 
whether it is being transmitted by some intelligent beings or whether 
it s caused by, say, an electromagnetic fi eld which they have not been 
able to detect yet etc. Similarly, when one asks what the meaning of 
life is, but is unable to explain to us what it is that they seek in asking 
this question, then I would be inclined to think that they are simply 
confused. Mere confusion, perplexity, or astonishment does not amount 
to curiosity. Now in those types of cases that Šuster mentions, one may 
raise the simple-sounding question “what is it?”. Such an interrogative 
may acquire different contents depending on the context. It may, for in-
stance, be used to ask what kind of phenomenon it is. Here the inosten-
sible term would then be “the kind of phenomenon the signal belongs 
to”. Such a term need not be vague or indeterminate. Beings that do not 
possess a language, or those that do not have a meta-concept like kind, 
cannot construct such an inostensible term, and hence cannot be curi-
ous about what kind of phenomenon they are experiencing. Perhaps 
what worries Šuster is that the kind of phenomenon in question may be 
something that we are totally unfamiliar with. It may very well be the 
case that we have no prior concept for such a kind. Is there any paradox 
here? No! If the phenomenon in question is of a novel kind, then simply 
by constructing the inostensible description “the kind of phenomenon 
the signal belongs to” we are able to represent the kind in question, 
though only inostensibly. Later if are lucky enough to determine the 
kind in question, we could be in a position to grasp this kind ostensibly. 
Šuster’s gives another interesting case:
An example might be a quote from Galileo (Dialogue Concerning the Two 
Chief World Systems, cited in Lambie 2014: 46):
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... considering that everyone who followed the opinion of Copernicus had 
at fi rst held the opposite, and was very well informed concerning the argu-
ments of Aristotle and Ptolemy, and that on the other hand none of the 
followers of Ptolemy and Aristotle had been formerly of the Copernican 
opinion... I commenced to believe that one who forsakes an opinion which 
he imbibed with his mother’s milk and which is supported by multitudes, 
to take up another that has few followers ... must of necessity be moved ... 
by the most effective arguments. This made me very curious to get to the 
bottom of the matter. (Šuster 2016: 329)
Šuster takes Galileo’s curiosity here to be an instance of meta-curiosity:
One way to understand Galileo’s “This made me very curious to get to the 
bottom of the matter” is precisely as a question of meta-curiosity: how to 
approach a certain problem and what concepts to use? (Šuster 2016: 333)
I am not sure whether Šuster’s interpretation of Galileo’s curiosity is 
historically accurate, but assuming that it is, once again I see no prob-
lem with it. A meta-representation by the use of an inostensible term 
such as “the way to approach the problem” or “the concepts to use in 
dealing with the problem” is perfectly fi ne; note that once again beings 
that do not possess the concept of ways of approaching a problem, or 
the concept of a concept, will not be in a position to construct such in-
ostensible terms even if they have a language. On the other hand, I am 
not convinced that Galileo’s curiosity was of this kind. It seems more 
plausible to assume that when Galileo wished to get to “the bottom 
of the matter”, given the context, what he wanted to know were “the 
facts that settle the dispute between the Ptolemaic and the Copernican 
theory”. If so, then what Galileo was curious about were those very 
facts, which he must have thought will settle the dispute in favor of 
the Copernicans. To generalize, when there is a dispute between two 
rival theories on an important topic, one may be curious as to what the 
facts are that would reveal which of the two theories is the correct one. 
Now clearly in such cases the object of curiosity is not very specifi c, but 
the fact remains that there is an inostensible term whose referent is 
being sought. To appreciate the value of this all one needs to consider 
is to think of people or animals who are unable to conceptualize facts 
and therefore are unable to construct such an inostensible term and 
be curious about its referent. Whenever there is dispute concerning an 
issue which we care to know it is a privilege to possess the capacity to 
refl ect on which view is correct and what facts would settle the issue 
in favor of it.
Perhaps the most important type of case that Šuster has doubts 
about how it can be accounted for by my theory concerns why-ques-
tions. Here is what he has to say on the matter: 
Well, reasons, causes and ways make for strange referents. First of all, what 
kinds of entities are we talking about? Inan says nothing about the referents 
of terms for reasons and causes. So let me try with a plausible hypothesis… 
we might try to postulate facts as candidate referents for inostensible terms 
referring to unknown reasons and causes…. Why was it Europeans who 
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conquered the world rather than the Chinese? It turns out that Europe had 
an optimal intermediate degree of fragmentation (a too-unifi ed society is 
a disadvantage, and a too-fragmented society is also a disadvantage). Dif-
fi cult to pin this down as “the object of the inostensible concept… Of course, 
there is always an inostensible description available for any “Why X?” ques-
tion. A simple “the reason for X” or, even more general, “the explanation of 
X” can be postulated as the unknown referent, whatever that might be. But 
this is just like saying that the “epistemic fi le” on X has been opened, but 
there is nothing in it, or that a fi le has been created without any descriptive 
content. (Šuster 2016: 331–332)
Why-questions are notoriously diffi cult to analyze. Sometimes we ask 
for a cause, sometimes a reason, and yet at other times we ask for an 
explanation without committing ourselves to whether that involves a 
cause or a reason or a combination of the two. Furthermore, the notions 
of cause, reason and explanation are also highly interest-relative; what 
counts as a good explanation of why something happened may differ 
from person to person, and even from context to context for the same 
person. Curiosity expressed by a why-question is then equally diffi cult 
to treat. As Šuster notes I have refrained from going into a detailed 
analysis of why-curiosity; but this was not due to an oversight on my 
part. Rather being aware of the diffi culties involved, I decided to set it 
aside so as not to get entangled in technical discussions on the notions 
of cause reason and explanation in general. The purpose of the book 
was to give a theory of curiosity in general; it was not to analyze each 
and every form of curiosity in detail. Of course it would have made 
the book a lot richer had I been able to allocate a separate section on 
why-curiosity, but it was simply too diffi cult a task to undertake. There 
is after all a large philosophical literature on causes and reasons and 
ones who specialize on the topic could do a better job on it. In fact, 
by utilizing the notion of inostensible reference one can write a whole 
book on why-curiosity with all its different forms. Now having said all 
this, I still think that Šuster’s criticism is missing a very important 
point. That is as vague and indeterminate and interest-relative and 
context-dependent as it may be, still the notions of cause and reason 
are precious concepts which allow us to raise why-questions, and more 
importantly they allow us to become curious about why something hap-
pened. To appreciate the signifi cance of this all we need to do is to con-
sider those beings that do not possess the concepts of cause and reason, 
for instance some animals, perhaps all, or small children who have not 
yet acquired a language. It seems to me to be extremely implausible to 
hold that such beings can in fact be curious as to why some event took 
place, or why someone performed the action that they did. Can a dog, 
for instance, be curious about, say, why you ate treating her badly, or 
an infant be curious about why her mother’s milk tastes different this 
time? Granted that animals and infants do show certain emotional re-
sponses in such cases when something unexpected happens; they may 
be surprised, or be perplexed, but none of these emotions can be iden-
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tifi ed with curiosity concerning causes and reasons. Aristotle, in the 
beginning of his Metaphysics, proclaims that all philosophy starts with 
wonder which is what leads us to ask why-questions. Had there been 
another creature on earth which had the capacity to ask why-questions 
out of curiosity, they too would have had at least the capacity to do phi-
losophy and science. There appears to be no evidence for this.
Šuster writes:
I do not think that all questions of curiosity can be reduced to the quest 
for objectual knowledge so masterfully covered in Inan’s book. “Why?” of 
causes, reasons and explanations cannot be (easily) accommodated in this 
model, even less so our desire for understanding. True, one can always coin 
inostensible descriptions like: “the explanation of this strange fact.” But, in 
this case, inostensible reference seems to be just the name of the problem 
and not the proper solution. (Šuster 2016: 333)
I must have to disagree with Šuster here; it seems to me that the abil-
ity to construct an inostensible term such as “the explanation of this 
strange fact” is one that can be possessed only by those kinds of beings 
who have not only mastered a language, but are also advanced enough 
to grasp higher-order epistemic concepts such as explanation. It may 
very well have been the case that in the early stages within the evolu-
tionary process of language our ancestors lacked this ability given that 
their language had not suffi ciently developed to include a term for the 
notion of explanation. That is perhaps why the emergence of science 
and philosophy had to wait for many millennia to come even when our 
ancestors spoke a fully recursive language.
Another problematic issue that Šuster rightly brings up has to do 
with our curiosity expressed by sentences that contain logical operators 
and connectives:
There is a familiar conundrum in the area of truthmakers—are there dis-
tinct kinds of facts corresponding to logically complex truths, such as nega-
tions, disjunctions, generalities? Are there negative facts, such as the fact 
that there is no life on Jupiter’s moon—presumably the answer to the ques-
tion: “Is there any life on Jupiter’s moon?” Also, causes and reasons are 
often disjunctive: why did the accident happen? Because Fred omitted to 
take precautions. What kind of empirical object (fact) is to be found in the 
world as the referent for Fred’s omission? Omissions are wildly disjunctive. 
(Šuster 2016: 330–331)
I must admit that in my book on curiosity I have not been able to give 
a complete account of how each and every instance of curiosity express-
ible by a term containing a logical operator can be subsumed under an 
inostensible concept. I think I did a fairly good job in handling curios-
ity expressed by conditional and disjunctive questions (see Chapter 2 
in Inan (2012)), but I was unable to put forth a detailed account of 
curiosity expressed by terms containing quantifi ers, and perhaps more 
importantly, my treatment of curiosity involving negations was at best 
scratching the surface of an issue that I now consider to be vital in 
our efforts to understand what truth is. After the publication of my 
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book I have been working on exactly this topic which has now turned 
into a book manuscript. Given the depth of the issue it is by no means 
possible for me to give a satisfactory answer to Šuster here, but I can 
at least give you a rough idea how I now treat such cases. By utiliz-
ing Frege’s notion of a reference-shifting operator I hold that for every 
sentence that contains a logical operator, the terms within the scope 
of that operator refer not to their customary referents but to their con-
tents. For instance, the sentence “the earth is not fl at”, when we give 
negation wide-scope, does not refer to a negative fact; rather it refers 
to the thought that the earth is fl at, and says of it that it does not cor-
responding to reality—which I take to be a special form of failure of 
reference. Such a sentence, given that it expresses a truth, does refer 
to reality, but its referent is, not an empirical fact, but rather what I 
call a “content-state”. When one is curious about whether the earth is 
fl at, the object of curiosity is a property of a thought. In such a case the 
proposition that the earth is fl at is inostensible, given that our subject 
does not know whether it refers to a content-state—in which case it 
is true—or whether fails to refer—in which case it is false. Disjunc-
tions, conditionals, quantifi ed sentences can also be handled in a simi-
lar fashion, though their analyses is more complicated than negation.2
Reply to Yiğit
With regard to the distinction I have made between ostensible and in-
ostensible propositional knowledge Safi ye Yiğit comes up with a very 
interesting objection:
For Inan, there are two ways in which a true propostion can be inostensible 
for a subject, in the fi rst case the subject does not know whether the propo-
sition is true, and in the other case the subject knows that the proposition 
is true, i.e., it refers to a fact, but the subject does not know the fact which 
makes the proposition true. This latter case gives rise to “inostensible know-
ledge”, in which the subject merely knows that there is a fact, but does not 
have suffi cient experience of the fact so as to make it ostensible. On the 
other hand, one’s knowledge could be deemed “ostensible knowledge” if all 
the terms that are contained in the given proposition are ostensible to the 
speaker; that is, if the speaker knows the referent of the terms in the propo-
sition. On the contrary, in inostensible knowledge cases, for Inan, there is 
at least one term in the sentence that is inostensible to the subject. He even 
claims that “the degree of ostensibility of a whole declarative sentence is 
also a function of the degree of ostensibility of its constituent terms”, which 
comes to mean that if all the terms in a sentence are ostensible to a subject, 
the sentence is also ostensible. However, I would like to allow for another 
possible way of having inostensible knowledge, which is perhaps the least 
noticed one of the inostensible knowledge cases. In this second case, one 
knows that the proposition expressed by the sentence is true, and one has 
ostensible knowledge of all the terms in a sentence, but the proposition as a 
2 I discuss these issues in length in my book manuscript (Truth As Reference and 
Falsity As Failure) currently under review for publication.
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whole is still inostensible to the subject. In other words, one knows that “a is 
F”, and both a and F are ostensible to the subject, but the knowledge of the 
proposition as a whole is still inostensible. (Yiğit 2016: 344)
In defense of her position Yiğit gives the following example:
For instance, one may think that the sentence “war is painful” is ostensible 
to a subject since both the concepts ‘war’ and ‘painful’ are ostensible for the 
subject and he knows the proposition to be true. But it might turn out that 
the fact the proposition as a unity refers to is not actually ostensible to the 
subject. (Yiğit 2016: 344)
Even if one’s experience of wars and one’s experience of pain, taken 
separately, can be considered to be suffi cient to make the term “war” 
as well as the term “painful” ostensible in their idiolect, it may, ac-
cording to Yiğit, be the case that they have little or no experience of a 
war’s being painful. In such a case though each and every term within 
a sentence is ostensible for the subject, the whole sentence may still be 
inostensible even when they come to know that it expresses a truth. 
This would then be a case in which there is inostensible knowledge of 
the proposition that war is painful, though the two constituent con-
cepts of the proposition are ostensible for the subject. To put it in or-
dinary language, one may know what war is, and one may know what 
it is for something to be painful, but one may nonetheless not know 
the painfulness of wars. If so, then my thesis that when one knows a 
proposition, the degree of the ostensibility of the sentence that express 
that proposition is a function of the degrees of the ostensibility of its 
constituent terms. Perhaps some may think that one drawback of the 
example that Yiğit gives is that it appears to be too subjective (i.e. the 
painfulness of war). This should not be worry though, since if what she 
says is correct other examples can be given to support her claim that 
are far less subjective. You could come to know, for instance, that the 
sun is setting in Perugia, if a friend tells you this on the phone, but you 
may still wonder about it. You may have experienced sunsets in the 
past, and you may have seen Perugia and know a lot about it, but you 
may never have experienced the sunset in Perugia, or even if you have, 
you may still be curious about the sun setting in Perugia now. It seems 
that in such a case though both the terms “Perugia” and “sunset” are 
on the far side of the ostensible end of the scale for you, “the sunset in 
Perugia now” would still be closer to the inostensible end, as indicated 
by the fact that you may be curious about it. Once again this would be 
a case in which you would know that the proposition in question is true, 
though you would have little acquaintance with the fact that makes 
the proposition true. This would then be another case of inostensible 
propositional knowledge. Yiğit’s argument then shows that the degree 
of ostensibility of a sentence is not merely a function of the degrees of 
ostensibility of its constituent parts. So I stand corrected.
In these cases of what I take to be inostensible propositional knowl-
edge, Yiğit suggests that we may use another epistemic verb in place 
of to know.
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Peculiar as it might sound, one suggestion could be to adopt the use of “testi-
fy” rather than “know” whenever one merely has inostensible propositional 
knowledge. In other words, at the entrance of the stairway to knowledge, 
one should perhaps be aware that one is not entitled to say one “knows” the 
proposition yet, or else one should at least realize that “to know” is gradable 
and it is possible to increase the quality of his knowledge. So, the use of “tes-
tify” should be seen as an attempt to raise the standard of knowledge rather 
than a vain effort to change language. Accordingly, if I were lucky enough to 
have ostensible knowledge of the beauty of love, this would stipulate me to 
say “I know that love is beautiful”; however, being lucky enough not to have 
experienced the painfulness of war in my life so far, I should perhaps say 
that “I testify that war is painful” rather than “I know that war is painful”. 
(Yiğit 2016: 346–347)
As I understand the reason that Yiğit prefers to appeal to the verb to 
testify rather than to know is because in such cases the subject does 
not have direct experience of a fact though he or she knows that the 
fact exists, and a typical way in which this could happen is when the 
subject knows that the fact exists by testimony. If there is such a thing 
as knowledge by testimony, it is usually the type of knowledge that I 
call inostensible. However not all inostensible knowledge is based on 
testimony. You may, for instance, know that the shortest spy is a spy, 
not because you have heard from some reliable source, but simply by 
inferring it from your background knowledge that there are spies, and 
no two people are exactly the same height. You may come to know that 
98th prime number is odd, not by being told that it is so, but by infer-
ring it from your background knowledge that all primes except 2 are 
odd. If you do not know who the shortest spy is, or what the 98th prime 
number is, then you do not know the facts that make these propositions 
true, though you know that they are true. In these cases, it would be 
wrong to say that you know these propositions by testimony. This is 
one reason why to testify cannot replace to know in all cases of inosten-
sible knowledge. There may in fact be languages that use two separate 
epistemic verbs for the distinction between ostensible and inostensible 
knowledge, but it seems that English is not one of them. There are 
languages such as Turkish that distinguish between the two cases in 
reporting an event not by appealing to two separate verbs, but by using 
two separate modes of past tense. If you have witnessed the event in 
question you use one mode, but if you haven’t, you use another. 
Reply to Günhan Altıparmak
The fact that within the somewhat wide literature on the Philosophy 
for Children (P4C) movement there has been very little discussion on 
curiosity is another good indicator of the resistance researchers have 
had, even if it is not at a conscious level, to philosophize on curiosity. 
Arousing curiosity within a P4C session is so important and central 
that the success of the session may be measured in terms of it. After all 
the purpose of a P4C session, as Irem Günhan Altıparmak nicely puts 
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it, is not to try to teach children philosophy, but rather to facilitate dis-
cussion that arouses their interest and curiosity. One normally would 
have expected that within the P4C literature the signifi cance of arous-
ing curiosity in the minds of the child is emphasized and discussed. 
It seems to me that Günhan Altıparmak’s contributions to this effect 
will be very valuable. What I fi nd most impressive in her approach is 
her willingness to develop new concepts. In one of our engaging discus-
sions two novel concepts emerged that appear to be vital in laying down 
the criteria to determine what makes a P4C session successful. One of 
them is the concept of curiosity arouser, which relates to Lipman’s no-
tion of attention grabber; this is such a useful notion not just for P4C 
but for all academic work on curiosity not just within philosophy, but 
also other related disciplines such as psychology, cognitive science as 
well as both theoretical and applied educational sciences. The other 
concept that Günhan Altıparmak makes use of is that of joint curiosity 
which is a special instance of the notion of joint attention, widely used 
especially in Cognitive Science. This notion is not just an extremely 
important one for our discussions concerning P4C but it has a wide 
area of applications. It relates to issues that could be addressed by so-
cial psychologists and even sociologists, as well as cognitive scienctists; 
furthermore, it seems to me that it is one that would have a good use 
in our efforts to understand the origins of human cultures especially 
the rise of the sciences and philosophy. I hope and expect that with 
Günhan Altıparmak’s efforts these two concepts will become a part of 
the standard P4C terminology. 
Reply to Arslan
Aran Arslan dwells upon an issue that has been bothering me for quite 
a while. Whether a term is ostensible or inostensible for a subject is 
an epistemic issue that has to do with the subject’s epistemic link to 
the referent of that term. Prima facie the distinction appears to have 
no semantic signifi cance, that is whether a term is ostensible or inos-
tensible appears to have no bearing on what proposition is expressed 
by a sentence which contains that term. It should not make any dif-
ference what a defi nite description such as “the capital of Rwanda” 
expresses when it appears in a sentence whether we know or don’t 
know its referent. What we understand when we grasp the meaning 
of the term “the capital of Rwanda” within a sentential context ought 
to be independent of whether we have spent all our life in Kigali, or 
whether we know nothing about this city—except perhaps that it is the 
capital of Rwanda. The content of a term should remain unaffected by 
the epistemic connection a subject has to its referent. If the ostensible/
inostensible distinction had semantic signifi cance, then it would have 
followed that when a speaker asks “what is the capital of Rwanda?” 
out of curiosity, the term would mean something different from what 
it would mean after she fi nds out the answer. Furthermore, it would 
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have followed that two people using the same description in discourse 
could mean different things by their use of that term if the term is os-
tensible for one and inostensible for the other. Suppose, for instance, 
a Rwanda native living in Kigali is conversing with an American who 
is quite ignorant about this country; and the American asks: “what is 
the capital of Rwanda?” If our Rwandan guy takes the utterance of the 
interrogative to be sincere, then he can easily deduce that the guy does 
not know what the capital is, which would imply that the description is 
inostensible. It would have been extremely weird for our Rwandan guy 
to even entertain the idea that the term “the capital of Rwanda” means 
something different for the American given that he does not know its 
referent. Normally speakers of a language do not have any training in 
the philosophy of language, nor do they need it to have a normal daily 
conversation. Quite naturally our Rwandan guy will take the term to 
mean whatever he means by it when he uses it. For singular terms 
such as defi nite descriptions it seems to me to be extremely implausible 
to hold that the ostensible/inostensible distinction has any semantic 
signifi cance. When we consider general terms, however, things perhaps 
are not that clear. For instance, when the term “helium” was fi rst in-
troduced as the chemical element causing a certain bright yellow line 
in the solar spectrum, very little was known about it, making the term 
highly inostensible in the idiolects of even the most experienced chem-
ists. After helium was discovered our knowledge of this element got 
richer and richer, bringing us closer and closer to the ostensible end 
of the epistemic scale. Did this epistemic progress have any impact on 
what the term “helium” means? I am inclined to think not, but I am 
sure that there is more room for disagreement here compared to the 
case of defi nite descriptions. It seems to me that the concept of helium 
that we use today is the same concept that was introduced by Edward 
Frankland and Joseph Lockyer before this element was even discov-
ered. Arguments on the other side may be given. For instance, a Kan-
tian may disagree by claiming that the concept of helium “expanded” 
(a metaphor used by Kant himself) the more we learned about it. I fi nd 
such views very problematic, though of course I cannot deal with the 
matter in more depth here.
As Arslan mentions there appear to be some special contexts in 
which the distinction may be said to have semantic signifi cance. Years 
ago in my doctoral dissertation I had very briefl y considered such con-
texts without committing myself to any view on the matter, and in my 
book I intentionally set these cases aside and did not discuss them in 
detail. I am grateful to Arslan for bringing this puzzling issue back to 
my attention. Now the contexts we are talking about here are cases 
in which a name is introduced by description for an object that the 
reference-fi xer has no experience of. Both the new name as well as its 
reference-fi xing description would then have to be inostensible for the 
reference-fi xer. Taking the worn-out example once again, we assume 
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that Le Verrier introduced the name “Neptune” by fi xing its referent 
through the description “the planet causing the perturbations in the 
orbit of Uranus”, which at the time referred to a planet that was un-
known to him, making both the description, as well is the name intro-
duced in terms of it, inostensible in his idiolect. Now it is important 
to acknowledge that, as Arslan notes “[b]efore its empirical discovery, 
the name ‘Neptune’ was an inostensible term for Leverrier”, though 
“[a]fter the discovery, he could fi x the referent of the name by osten-
sion.” We are of course assuming that the planet that we nowadays 
call “Neptune” does in fact perturb Uranus, and if so, the name before 
the discovery referred to the same planet that we later discovered. Af-
ter the discovery the earlier reference-fi xing description lost its special 
status; that is because we now are in a position to point to Neptune, 
through its image we receive on a telescope, and re-fi x the reference 
of the name by ostension. Now it would appear that the following sen-
tence would express a truth for Le Verrier when the name was inosten-
sible, but later after the discovery when the term became ostensible the 
very same sentence expresses a falsity.
“It is certain that if Neptune exists, then it is the planet causing the pertur-
bations in the orbit of Uranus.”3
I too was once convinced, just like Arslan, that in these special epis-
temic contexts the ostensible/inostensible distinction bears a semantic 
signifi cance. Yet I now fi nd the whole issue quite puzzling, so much so 
that I refrain from adopting a position. 
Reply to Miščević
In his illuminating piece Nenad Miščević forcefully argues that “curi-
osity is the foundational epistemic virtue”, a view to which I am very 
sympathetic. There is hardly anything he says that I would wish to 
argue. Perhaps there is only one issue which may be a source of dis-
agreement. Miščević proclaims that “truth is the primary goal”, a view 
that he has defended in previous papers as well (see his (2007)). This 
however, should be taken with some caution, for Miščević argues in 
length that “mere true belief is not the fundamental bearer”. That is 
because, on his view, knowing is more valuable than merely having a 
true belief. Once again I totally agree. Nonetheless I am reluctant to 
accept that truth is the primary goal. Now it may be the case that for 
beings likes us who have a language that contains declarative sentenc-
es and the concept of truth, reaching truth is important and valuable. 
In that sense it may be taken to be a goal. However, saying that it is 
“the primary goal” seems to suggest that it is essential, in the sense 
that for any epistemic agent with a language reaching truth ought to 
be the agent’s goal. This I wish to deny. The reason is that I reject the 
3 See Inan (2012) Chapter 12 Limits of Curiosity and Its Satisfaction for a more 
detailed discussion of this and similar examples.
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idea that the concept of truth is essential to language. Language may 
have evolved differently in such a way that its basic syntactic unit to 
think about reality is not a declarative sentence but rather something 
different. Such a language would not contain the concept of truth. An 
example of such a possible language is what I call “Whenglish” which 
is a language just like English though it contains not sentences but 
wentences which are what we would normally call the nominalizations 
of our sentences. Whengllish is a full-fl edged language; it has compo-
sitionality and recursion, and it has all the resources to do whatever 
we do with English, science, philosophy mythology etc. A Whenglish 
philosopher would never argue that truth is the primary goal, given 
that the language does not contain the concept of truth. Rather than 
saying that the earth is round, Whenglish speakers use its wentence 
equivalent “the earth’s being round”. While we care about our sentence 
“the earth is round” being true, Whenglish speakers care about their 
wentence “the Earth’s being round” having a referent. In their lan-
guage the primary epistemic goal would be, not truth, but reference. 
In more recent work I have argued in length that truth is nothing but 
a very special form of reference. Given all this I am inclined to think 
that if anything is the primary epistemic goal, it is reference, and not 
its subspecies truth. In this sense I believe that truth is overvalued. 
Same goes for propositional knowledge. If truth is not essential to lan-
guage, neither is propositional knowledge. Whenglish does not contain 
propositions, given that it does not have truth-bearers. They too have 
the notion of knowledge, but only in its objectual mode. While we know 
that the earth is round, Whenglish speakers know the earth’s being 
round. This is why I believe that objectual knowledge is far more im-
portant than propositional knowledge. Though a signifi cant portion of 
Miščević’s essay is dedicated to the discussion of why having proposi-
tional knowledge is more valuable than having a merely true belief, he 
does address the issue in terms of reference and objectual knowledge: 
I have been telling the story in terms of propositional knowledge, but it can 
be retold in terms of objectual curiosity and knowledge, dear to Inan. So, 
in the story retold, you are interested in who the new president of Croatia 
is. You have an inostensible description of him/her, namely “the new presi-
dent”. What you want is a more ostensible information, let say the name. 
(with all the problems that go with it, listed and brilliantly analyzed by Inan 
in 2012: 142 ff, in connection with the name “Kigali”). Now, with the practi-
cal joke I actually gave you the right information, its Kolinda. Still, you are 
not satisfi ed, after you hear about my actual ignorance at the time of giving 
the info. What is needed is the package deal: ostensible information with 
some guarantee of reliability. I cannot defend the fully isolated true belief 
(except going the Martin Luther WAY: here i stand and believe, ich kann 
nicht anders!). (Miščević 2016: 410–411)
The distinction between mere true belief and propositional knowledge 
can be applied to one’s epistemic status with regard to the referent 
of a designator. In Miščević’s example our subject gets the unreliable 
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but true information that the new president of Croatia is Kolinda. In 
such a case the subject may believe that the term “the new president of 
Croatia” is ostensible in his idiolect, in case he believes that he knows 
that the new president is Kolinda. Assuming that he is not justifi ed 
in believing that the new president is Kolinda, this term would then 
actually be inostensible, making his belief that it is ostensible false. 
We then have a very special instance of the issue concerning whether 
knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Is having the knowl-
edge what the referent of a term is more valuable than merely having 
a true belief about it? Pritchard would have to say “no” (see his (2011)), 
and Miščević disagrees. I am inclined to side with Miščević here. In 
terms of various practical concerns there would indeed be no differ-
ence in value between the two cases. If our subject is, for instance, a 
journalist who is going to write a column in his daily concerning the 
elections results, it would not matter whether the term “the new presi-
dent of Croatia” is actually ostensible or not. It would seem that he 
would produce exactly the same column regardless of whether he has 
an unjustifi ed true belief that the new president is Kolinda, or whether 
he actually knows this. But as Miščević notes, when our subject fi nds 
out that his source was unreliable, he would be dissatisfi ed; in fact, a 
journalist would be greatly disappointed in such a case: Not only that 
he would never trust his source again, but he would certainly feel great 
relief that he was accidently given true information and did not make 
a fool of himself. Though it makes no difference whether the term “the 
new president of Croatia” is ostensible or inostensible in his idiolect at 
the time he writes his column as long as he gets its referent right, it 
does make a big difference with regard to his attitudes and emotions 
after he fi nds out later that the description was in fact inostensible. 
The difference can also be put in terms of curiosity. When our journal-
ist fi nds out that his source was unreliable and comes to realize that he 
does not know that his belief that the new president is Kolinda is true, 
he would become curious who the new president is. Having an unjusti-
fi ed true belief is better than having a false belief, but it is still a form 
of ignorance, and awareness of this ignorance will give rise to curiosity 
(given that our subject has an interest in the topic.) Now, of course, one 
may object that if our journalist never fi nds out that his source was 
unreliable, it would seem that there would be no difference between 
him merely having a true belief and him actually knowing that the new 
president is Kolinda.
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